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The General Anti-Avoidance Rule
Prepared By Robert Omura

The content of this article is intended to be informational only. We caution you against using or relying upon any information contained in this article without first seeking legal advice regarding your particular matter. All matters arising from the use of our website, including this article, shall be governed by Alberta law and shall be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Alberta.

 

 

 

            Largely in response to the guidelines proposed by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Stubart decision four years earlier in 1988 Parliament enacted the GAAR. The GAAR seeks to prevent abusive tax avoidance schemes that would otherwise be permissible under a literal interpretation of the Act but would in fact frustrate the proper application of the Act. Until recently it has seldom been used; and still rarer discussed. The relevant portions of the Act are as follows:

245 (1) In this section,

 

“tax benefit” means a reduction, avoidance or deferral of tax or other amount payable under this Act or an increase in a refund of tax or other amount under this Act;

 

“tax consequences” to a person means the amount of income, taxable income, or taxable income earned in Canada of, tax or other amount payable by or refundable to the person under this Act, or any other amount that is relevant for the purposes of computing that amount;

 

transaction” includes an arrangement or event.

 

(2) Where a transaction is an avoidance transaction, the tax consequences to a person shall be determined as is reasonable in the circumstances in order to deny a tax benefit that, but for this section, would result, directly or indirectly, from that transaction or from a series of transactions that includes that transaction.

 

(3) An avoidance transaction means any transaction

 

(a)     that, but for this section, would result, directly or indirectly, in a tax benefit, unless the transaction may reasonably be considered to have been undertaken or arranged primarily for bona fide purposes other than to obtain the tax benefit; or

 

(b)     that is part of a series of transaction, which series, but for this section, would result, directly or indirectly, in a tax benefit, unless the transaction may reasonably be considered to have been undertaken or arranged primarily for bona fide purposes other than to obtain the tax benefit.

 

(4) For greater certainty, subsection 245(2) does not apply to a transaction where it may reasonably be considered that the transaction would not result directly or indirectly in a misuse of the provisions of this Act or an abuse having regard to the provisions of this Act, other than this section, read as a whole.

 

 

The Facts and History of Canada Trustco

 

            In 1996 Canada Trustco Mortgage Company (“CTMC”) entered a leveraged sale lease-back strategy for the purchase of trailers, which permitted the CTMC to claim a substantial capital cost allowance (“CCA”) at a minimal of risk. In 2002 the Minister of National Revenue reassessed CTMC on its 1997 taxation year and denied the CCA. CTMC appealed.

 

            At the Tax Court of Canada the judge found an avoidance transaction giving rise to a tax benefit under ss. 245(1) and (3) of the Act. However, the GAAR did not apply because the CCA provisions allowed CTMC to deduct CCA based on “cost”. The Minister appealed.

 

            The Minister faired no better on appeal. A unanimous Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal citing OSFC Holdings Ltd. v. Canada, 2001 FCA 260. In interpreting the policy underlying the CCA, Evans J.A. held that “costs” meant “legal” costs, being the purchase price paid by the taxpayer, not “real” or “economic” costs as alleged by the Minister. Thus, when the CCA provisions were read as a whole there was no clear and unambiguous policy underlying those provisions that would render the transaction a misuse or abuse of those provisions. The Minister appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

 

 

The Facts and History of Mathew

 

            Through a series of transactions involving the use of a partnership vehicle an insolvent corporation (“STC”), in the business of lending money, sold its unrealized losses from its mortgage investment business to several arm’s length investors. The losses were used by the arm’s length investors to reduce their taxable incomes.

 

The Act specifically prohibits the transfer of losses between taxpayers, except in specific circumstances such as for the transfer of such losses to a related party. The liquidator for STC could not realize on the losses because of the insolvency but could maximize its returns if it could sell its losses to a third party for a fee.

 

The strategy called for the unrealized losses to be first transferred from STC to a non-arm’s length party, Partnership A, for a 99% interest in Partnership A. In turn Partnership B, a party at arm’s length from STC, acquired a 99% interest in Partnership A. Under the partnership rules, it was presumed that the accrued losses could then flow to each of the individual investors in proportion to their relative interest in Partnership B.

 

As a result of sales or write-downs of STC’s mortgage investments in 1993 Partnership A realized a significant loss of which 99% was allocated to Partnership B. Partnership B allocated these losses amongst its investors. In turn each investor used their share of the loss to reduce their taxable incomes in 1993 and 1994.

 

The Minister of National Revenue reassessed the investors and denied the deductions. The investors appealed.

 

            The Tax Court judge followed the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in OSFC and dismissed the appeal. The investors appealed.

 

            At the Federal Court of Appeal the investors lost again. The Federal Court of Appeal followed OSFC in denying the appeal. The investors appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

 

 

The Supreme Court of Canada

 

            The Court laid down seven guiding principles for the application of the GAAR which are summarized in Canada Trustco at 66:

 

1.                  Three requirement must be established to permit application of the GAAR:

 

(1)               A tax benefit resulting from a transaction or part of a series of transactions (s. 245(1) and (2));

 

(2)               that the transaction is an avoidance transaction in the sense that it cannot be said to have been reasonably undertaken or arranged primarily for a bona fide purpose other than to obtain a tax benefit; and

 

(3)               that there was abusive tax avoidance in the sense that it cannot be reasonably concluded that a tax benefit would be consistent with the object, spirit or purpose of the provisions relied upon by the taxpayer.

 

2.                  The burden is on the taxpayer to refute (1) and (2), and on the Minister to establish (3).

 

3.                  If the existence of abusive tax avoidance is unclear, the benefit of the doubt goes to the taxpayer.

 

4.                  The courts proceed by conducting a unified textual, contextual and purposive analysis of the provisions giving rise to the tax benefit in order to determine why they were put in place and why the benefit was conferred. The goal is to arrive at a purposive interpretation that is harmonious with the provisions of the Act that confer the tax benefit, read in the context of the whole Act.

 

5.                  Whether the transactions were motivated by any economic, commercial, family or other non-tax purpose may form part of the factual context that the courts may consider in the analysis of abusive tax avoidance allegations under s. 245(4). However, any finding in this respect would form only one part of the underlying facts of a case, and would be insufficient by itself to establish abusive tax avoidance. The central issue is the proper interpretation of the relevant provisions in light of their context and purpose.

 

6.                  Abusive tax avoidance may be found where the relationships and transactions as expressed in the relevant documentation lack a proper basis relative to the object, spirit or purpose of the provisions that are purported to confer the tax benefit, or where they are wholly dissimilar to the relationships or transactions that are contemplated by the provisions.

 

7.                  Where the Tax Court judge has proceeded on a proper construction of the provisions of the Income Tax Act and on findings supported by the evidence, appellate tribunals should not interfere, absent a palpable and overriding error.

 

 

Three Step Analysis

 

The application of the GAAR involves a three step process as set out in ss. 245 (1), (2), (3) and (4) of the Act.

 

First, the transaction or a part of a series of transactions must give rise to a tax benefit. This is a factual determination. The taxpayer has the burden of refuting the Minister’s allegation.

 

Second, the transaction or a part of a series of transactions must be an avoidance transaction, such that it is not arranged primarily for a bona fide purpose other than to obtain a tax benefit. This removes from scrutiny under the GAAR those transactions that may reasonably be viewed as arranged primarily for a non-tax purpose, including those primarily for a family, investment or business purpose. It also does not permit “recharacterization” of the transaction by comparison with some alternative transaction that might have achieved a similar result with higher tax consequences. It is a factual determination. Here too the taxpayer bears the burden of refuting the Minister’s allegation.

 

Third, the avoidance transaction must be an abusive avoidance transaction, such that it cannot be reasonably concluded that a tax benefit would be consistent with the object, spirit or purpose of the provisions relied upon by the taxpayer. It requires a two part inquiry involving mixed fact and law. First, the provisions relied upon to obtain the tax benefit must be reviewed to determine their object, spirit and purpose. Second, the avoidance transaction must be reviewed to see if it defeats or frustrates that purpose.

 

Interpretively, the use of the double negative in the language of s. 245(4) gives rise to a presumption that the tax benefit arising from the literal interpretation of the Act is not abusive. Such a transaction should be allowed unless the abusive nature of the transaction is clear. Once a taxpayer shows compliance with the literal wording of a provision, he should not be required to disprove he has violated the object, spirit or purpose of the provision. The Minister should bear the burden of showing that the object, spirit or purpose of the provision has been defeated or frustrated. It therefore falls upon the Minister to identify the object, spirit or purpose of the provision.

 

 

The Canada Trustco Decision

 

            There was no dispute that the sale lease-back strategy produced a tax benefit and was an avoidance transaction. In dismissing the Minister’s appeal Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Major, for the whole of the Court, found that the scheme did not defeat or frustrate the object, spirit or purpose of the CCA provisions or the Act as a whole. The CCA provisions specifically defined “costs” as the amount paid to acquire the asset, not the “real” or  “economic” cost as alleged by the Minister. This was consistent with the well-established and generally understood use of the term “cost”. Therefore, the CCA provisions and the Act as a whole permitted the deduction of CCA based on the interpretation of cost put forth by CTMC.

 

 

The Mathew Decision

 

            The taxpayers in Mathew faired less well than their counterparts in Canada Trustco. The tax benefit and the avoidance transaction were not disputed. The general policy of the Act is to prohibit the transfer of losses between taxpayers, except where specifically permitted for a particular purpose. The purpose of s. 18(13) is to prevent a transferor in the business of lending money from realizing a superficial loss, except where the loss is transferred to a non-arm’s length party because the transferor and the transferee are for tax purposes the same and the loss, at disposition, is superficial and will be realized by the transferor, through the non-arm’s length party, at some later date. To allow an arm’s length party to participate in the loss would defeat or frustrate the wall intentionally created by Parliament to prevent the trading of losses between taxpayers. In dismissing the appeal Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Major, for the whole of the Court, agreed with conclusions of Dussault T.C.J. and endorsed them.

 

For further information please do not hesitate to contract the author of this Article, Robert Omura

 

 


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